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A Commentary on
Attention as an effect not a cause
by Krauzlis, R. J., Bollimunta, A., Arcizet, F., and Wang, L. (2014). Trends Cogn. Sci. 18, 457–464.
doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2014.05.008
Recently, Krauzlis et al. (2014) introduced a framework in which attention arises from value-based
decision-making mechanisms centered on basal ganglia. Appropriate decision-making is made by
identifying the current “state” of the animal and its environment. Defining a state requires interpret-
ing different sources of information from the subject’s internal and external world, knowledge and
needs. The authors provide evidence from physiology, neuroanatomy, clinical studies and mod-
eling. Here I re-examine this framework in the light of the following keys that help understand a
cognitive function: its architecture and neural correlates, its process and mechanisms, its theory
and metaphors. The component of attention described by Krauzlis et al. arises as a functional con-
sequence of basal ganglia activity, suggesting that it may be treated as an effect not a cause (Krauzlis
et al., 2014).
Since the original work by James (1890/1950), thousands of contributions have been published
in the field of attention (e.g., over 59791 articles in PudMed with “attention” as a subheading). From
this ocean of research, some consensus has emerged about the architecture of attention. In psychol-
ogy, three attention macrosystems have been delineated: arousal or vigilance, selective attention or
selection, and attentional control (Pashler, 1998). These modules have been validated by physiol-
ogy as corresponding to distinct neural networks of the animal (Maunsell, 2004) and of the human
(Parasuraman, 2000) brains. Vigilance has been associated with the activity of brainstem reticular
formation and diffuse thalamic substance (Robbins, 1997; Coull, 1998; Paus, 2000); selection with
that of cortical—particularly parietal—and subcortical areas (Snow et al., 2009; Lovejoy and Krau-
zlis, 2010; Capotosto et al., 2013); and control with that of cortical—particularly prefrontal—and
subcortical areas (Desimone et al., 1990; Knight et al., 1995; Stuss, 2006). In light of this architec-
ture, I suggest that Krauzlis et al. (2014)’s model might not concern attention as a whole but may
be restricted to one attentional system: selection and even more spatial selection. My argument is
twofold. First, 32 of their 102 references (n◦1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 24, 33, 44,
52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 75, 100) are dedicated to selection whereas 0 and
1 (n◦81) respectively concern vigilance and control. Second, the reported neural bases and related
brain damages are compatible with those of selection and related disorders: spatial neglect and
Parkinson’s disease (Krauzlis et al., 2014).
With respect to the process, the macromechanism regulating attention uses subcortical
pathways. First, Krauzlis et al. suggest that the route from superior colliculus (SC) to
medial dorsal nucleus of thalamus provides corollary discharge signals about eye move-
ments to frontal eye field and convey signals to the striatum through prefrontal cortex. Sec-
ond, the route from SC intermediate layers to the parafascicular nucleus through thalamus
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would be the predominant source of thalamus inputs to path-
ways in the striatum. Third, the route from SC intermediate
layers to substantia nigra pars compacta would provide signal
related to the detection of salient sensory events. Other routes
leading to basal ganglia may play a role in this non-cortical cir-
cuit for attention (Krauzlis et al., 2014). It is a quality of the
authors to rehabilitate the subcortex in (selective) attention and
to recall that attention is not the exclusivity of cortex. They indeed
review that invertebrates (honeybees, Drosophilia) or vertebrates
without cortices (pigeons, peacocks, owls, frogs, salamanders or
zebrafish) do exhibit signs of attention. Such model is remi-
niscent with (pre)motor theories of attention highlighting the
role of subcortical areas in attention—whether it be called atten-
tion, imagination, emulation, simulation or projection. Nineteen
years ago, Berthoz (1996) suggested the role of areas from brain-
stem to basal ganglia in imagination as a functional consequence
of movement gating, and Kustov and Robinson (1996) demon-
strated the critical role of SC in attention shifts. At the cell level,
the micromechanism by which basal ganglia inputs are differ-
entially weighted uses a process similar to Bayesian inference
(Krauzlis et al., 2014). In this way, the model partially resembles
competition models, whether they be called diffusion (Ratcliff,
1978), linear approach to threshold with ergodic rate (Carpenter,
1981) or race (Schall, 1995).
With regard to the theory, given that alternatively “everyone”
(James, 1890/1950) and “no one” (Pashler, 1998) knows what
attention is, the history of psychology has exploited different
metaphors to account for what attention can be. The debates
have turned around early vs. late filtering (Treisman, 1969), exci-
tatory vs. inhibitory mechanisms (Laberge and Brown, 1989),
or bottom-up (i.e., stimulus-driven or exogenous) vs. top-down
(i.e., goal-directed or endogenous) processes (Awh et al., 2012).
The cause vs. effect nature of attention has been reviewed by
Fernandez-Duque and Johnson (2002), and the idea that atten-
tion may be an effect not a cause has been advanced by Desi-
mone and Duncan (1995). In that sense, attention is an emergent
property or epiphenomenon of the fact that when stimulus rep-
resentations compete for processing resources, one of them wins
(Fernandez-Duque and Johnson, 2002). In Krauzlis et al. (2014)’s
model, attention is a functional consequence of the competition
between basal ganglia circuits. Like other competition models, it
has the advantage of banishing the control homunculus (Mon-
sell and Driver, 2000) and the disadvantage of seeing attention as
something we can do without (Fernandez-Duque and Johnson,
2002). But Krauzlis et al. (2014) also admit that control is still
needed. Indeed they indicate that one function of inputs from
prefrontal cortex to striatum could be to provide additional non-
sensory inputs to expand the number of states and associated
value functions that can be acquired. For that reason, I suggest
that Krauzlis et al. (2014)’s model is likely to be a “biased competi-
tionmodel” according to Fernandez-Duque and Johnson (2002)’s
taxonomy. Though the concept of a central executive is elimi-
nated, the model is still using feedback loops that bias the infor-
mation processing of upcoming stimuli. However the question
of how such modulation gets decided remains a mystery. This
leads me to the conclusion that Krauzlis et al. (2014)’s model does
not prove attention to be mainly an effect. Rather their model
may be a hybrid theory in which attention is complex, compris-
ing causes and effects, where there is still room for attention as
a cause.
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